The Problem of Moral Heroism in O.G. Drobnitskii’s Ethics

Abstract

The solution of the problem of moral heroism by the famous Soviet ethicist O.G. Drobnitskii is analyzed. The essence of the problem lies in the fact that the value-normative content of morality is traditionally interpreted as universal, though moral heroism paradoxically implies performing exceptional acts or leading an exceptional way of life (separate heroic deeds or long-term altruistic service). In contemporary ethics, moral heroism is characterized primarily as a form of supererogatory behavior, i.e., having high moral value but not obligatory. The existence of such behavior is explained by the mismatch between the two moral classifications of actions: deontic and axiological. For critics of supererogation, allowing this mismatch is identical with ignoring the obvious good-ought tie-up. Drobnitskii held a position similar to that of the critics of supererogation. For him, the ought-moment of morality has an absolute priority over the value-moment. It follows that, for him, it is impossible to identify an action as morally positive, promoting the moral good and not consider it a fulfillment of some requirement (an obligatory one). The idea of supererogation is incompatible with Drobnitskii’s strict universalism, objectivism and imperativism. However, he considers moral heroism to be a real phenomenon and a product of the individualization of moral requirements. Drobnitskii understands moral heroism and selfless devotion to a cause as transformations of general moral duty in special, extreme circumstances. A moral hero fulfils some additional obligations and surrenders some of his rights, and he is also able to act in situations where implementing moral principles requires self-sacrifice, but does not entail obvious morally significant results in the short-term perspective.