Collective Responsibility and Collective Deliberation

Abstract

The question of whether the imposition of collective moral responsibility can be a morally acceptable practice is considered. The author answers this question in the affirmative and suggests three conditions, the fulfillment of which is sufficient for the justified imposition of collective moral responsibility. These conditions are as follows: the existence of a group of agents that is capable to be an object of imposing collective responsibility and at the same time cannot be reduced to a mere aggregate of its members; the possession by this group of certain properties, abilities, inclinations or obligations that no member of this group, taken separately, possesses; the ability of the group to exercise reasonable joint control over the manifestations of some of its inclinations and the fulfillment of its obligations. Such ability allows a group to rationally resist the realization of some of its collective inclinations and thereby demonstrate the possession of certain normative attitudes. The possession of such attitudes justifies the ability of a group to bear collective moral responsibility for its collective actions. It is shown that the rejection of the practice of imposing collective moral responsibility, firstly, does not allow us to avoid cases of moral luck, and, secondly, leaves collective actions without moral consequences. At the same time, it is also shown that the imposition of collective moral responsibility does not require its distribution among the members of the group. The imposition of collective moral responsibility can be understood as a change in the attitude toward the group without changing the attitude toward any of its members.