Ecological Subjectivity in the Philosophy of Posthumanism

Abstract

The changes in perceptions of subjectivity in posthumanism are analyzed. Considering the differences between a “strong” and a “weak” subject, the author shows that environmental subjectivity in posthumanism implements the project of a weak philosophy. The question of subjectivity in this case is determined not in connection with consciousness, but in connection with the transformation of corporeality. Posthumanism suggests the transformation of a person through hybridization, that is, various manipulations of the body (for example, by adding plant and animal genes to a person). The attitude towards oneself is understood here as a mirror peering into one's otherness, which is now connected not with the figure of other, but with an animal. The basic opposition of «man-animal» is called into question, since qualitative differences between man and animal disappear. It is shown that the rationale of this posthumanistic idea is based on Aristotle and postmodern philosophy. Similarly, posthumanism redefines the boundary between man and technology, opening up wide opportunities for human modification and transformation into a cyborg. The essence of the philosophical foundations of this position is revealed and it is concluded that procedural philosophy allows not only to eliminate the differences between man and nature, but also to identify the artificial and the natural. Thus, subjectivity is understood as belonging to existence, and a more environmentally friendly subjectivity of a person means the need to incorporate other beings into his world. Eco-friendly subjectivity in this case boils down to ecological physicality, that is, to an attempt to concentrate different entities in the body.